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ARTICLES
THE RELATIONSHIP OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO
PROSECUTION APPEALS
James A. Strazzella*
The complexity of double jeopardy law has the potential to pull
related doctrines into its whirlpool. The relationship of double jeop-
ardy protection to prosecution appeals is frequently misunderstood,
seldom clearly discussed, and often misstated in statutes and cases,
even in Supreme Court case law on occasion. In light of these miscon-
ceptions, the precise relationship between double jeopardy and prose-
cution appeals bears analysis and clarification.
Federal double jeopardy law is defined in a considerable amount
of case law developed in appeals brought by both defendants and
prosecutors. In an important class of these cases (dealt with in this
Article) the double jeopardy issue arises in the context of the possible
dismissal of a prosecution appeal, with appealability turning on
whether double jeopardy bars further trial court proceedings. In fact,
much of the content of double jeopardy law is recent, the by-product
of motions to dismiss appeals filed by federal prosecutors under a re-
vised statute broadening their right to appeal.' The fact that Supreme
* Professor of Law, James G. Schmidt Chair in Law, Temple University Law
School. J.D. 1964, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B-A. 1961, Villanova
University.
1 Most of this Supreme Court litigation arose beginning in the 1970s, following a
federal statutory amendment widening the United States prosecution appeal rights.
See infra text accompanying note 19. A combination of two factors made it unneces-
sary earlier for the Supreme Court to consider double jeopardy issues in the context
of prosecution appeal rights, except in limited circumstances. One factor was the
statutory restriction on federal prosecutors' appeal rights existing prior to amend-
ment of the federal prosecution appeal act. See infra note 24; see also United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975) (collecting recent Supreme Court cases to that
point); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (limiting a different aspect ofJenkins
and collecting other recent cases dealing with the 1970 statute). Moreover, until the
DoubleJeopardy Clause was applied to the states in 1969, see infra note 2, state convic-
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Court and lower court cases have repeatedly decided double jeopardy
issues in the context of prosecution appeals makes it clear that there is
a relationship between double jeopardy and appealability, but the
connection of double jeopardy to prosecution appeals is frequently
misconceived. When recent cases do mention any rationale, the dis-
cussions often obscure the precise reasons for the result.
It is an important premise of this Article that double jeopardy law
does not itself bar prosecution appeals, despite frequent assertions to
the contrary. When it is involved in barring a prosecution appeal,
doublejeopardy doctrine does so only in combination with some addi-
tional legal principle. This two-step analytical process, explored in
this Article, has important-and potentially different-ramifications
for state and federal cases which can be better understood in light of
some related axioms of double jeopardy law.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY BACKGROUND
Double jeopardy protection is designed as a trial-level protection,
protecting the defendant against being twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.2 The protection bars repetition of a particular occur-
rence: subjecting a defendant to 'Jeopardy." This occurrence is con-
stitutionally defined as occurring at the point at which ajury is sworn,
or (in a non-jury trial) the point at which the judge begins to receive
evidence,3 thereby protecting a defendant from certain secondjeop-
ardy actions in the trial court. Protecting the defendant from litiga-
tion in an appellate court proceeding falls outside the protection
from second jeopardy because the appeal itself does not subject the
tions involving double jeopardy issues of any sort reached the Supreme Court only in
limited doses.
2 The U.S. Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause, applicable in both federal
and state prosecutions, provides: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V (applied
to the states in Benton v. Mayland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). State constitutions also
typically contain double jeopardy protection. See generally James A. Shellenberger &
James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The Develop-
ment of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 4 n.1 (1995).
Although these state provisions may differ somewhat from the federal clause in text or
judicial interpretation, they nevertheless also conceive the double jeopardy bar as a
trial level protection. This Article's discussion of the federal clause therefore gener-
ally applies to state clauses as well.
3 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (defining point at which jeopardy
attaches injury trial for purposes of state as well as federal trial; also stating in dictum
when jeopardy attaches in non-jury trial). For other authorities relating to the point
at which jeopardy attaches, see Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 2, at 121 n.414,
162 n.565.
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defendant to a second 'Jeopardy" in its constitutionally defined sense.
This conclusion impliedly follows not only from the definition of
'Jeopardy," but also from the historical purposes served by the Clause.
The possibility that a ruling favorable to the defendant may be
reviewed in a prosecution-instigated appellate proceeding may surely
involve burdens of a sort if the defense participates in the appellate
litigation. Nevertheless, those potential burdens-however intimidat-
ing or onerous they might appear-are not the type of trial-court dan-
gers historically deserving of constitutional protection.4 In varying
degrees, Supreme Court language appears to recognize as much,5 as
have the appellate cases discounting the scarce direct claim that ap-
pellate litigation in and of itself runs afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 6 The conclusion is also consistent with, and follows from,
4 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), contains the much-repeated
formulation of the protection offered by the Clause: "[The] guarantee has been said
to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense." For further discussion concerning the history and
purposes of double jeopardy law, including the development of modern double jeop-
ardy principles, see Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 2, at 117-21, 138-70.
5 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132-36 (1980) (sustaining pros-
ecution's statutory right to appeal sentence, noting that the "double jeopardy focus
... is not on the appeal but on the relief that is requested" and further stating that
double jeopardy considerations "have no significant application to the prosecution's
statutorily granted right to review a sentence"); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
336-42 (1975) (agreeing with prosecution argument that "the constitutional protec-
tion against Government appeals attaches only where there is danger of subjecting
the defendant to a second trial for the same offense" and further stating that "[t]he
development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins thus sug-
gests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government
appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial"); see also United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (noting Wilson's interpre-
tation that "the controlling constitutional principle focused on prohibitions against
multiple trials" and discussing reasons behind double jeopardy protection); United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975) (discussing in dictum, "[t] o be sure, the
defendant would prefer that the Government not be permitted to appeal or that the
judgment of conviction not be entered, but this interest of the defendant is not one
that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to protect"). But see the language in
Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986) (discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 50-62).
6 See Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120 (1907) (finding it unnecessary to dis-
cuss at length a defendant's contention that the government cannot be allowed a writ
of error in a criminal case when the indictment was quashed, and stating: "We do not
perceive the difficulty .... If the Fifth Amendment has any bearing, the [Criminal
Appeals A] ct of 1907 is directed to judgments rendered before the moment ofjeop-
ardy is reached"); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc),
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those Supreme Court cases refusing to dismiss government appeals
when the remedy would not require further jeopardy.7 Were it other-
wise, statutes allowing prosecution appeals under any circumstances
would be unconstitutional, a conclusion that would invalidate the
long-accepted view that such appeals may be allowed if statutorily au-
thorized. 8 Moreover, such a restrictive view would encompass and
preclude any prosecution appeal to a higher appellate court from an
rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (discussed below); Commonwealth v. Ther-
rien, 420 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Mass. 1981) (discussing in dictum that earlier case stands
for the proposition that "without raising any significant double jeopardy question, this
court properly may consider, pursuant to statute, a case on further appeal where the
[intermediate court] has reversed a conviction" and noting earlier that defendant
made no claim that prosecution appeal is barred by Double Jeopardy Clause); see also
United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908) (rejecting defendant's constitutional chal-
lenge to statute allowing government review in Supreme Court when demurrer sus-
tained while not allowing defendant a similar immediate appellate review when
demurrer denied, and generally stating that statutory authorization did not violate
any constitutional right of the accused).
In Spinelli, the convicted defendant's initial appeal was heard by a circuit court
panel which reversed the conviction on Fourth Amendment grounds. The govern-
ment successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc and the defendant objected that a
rehearing would violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The
court en banc noted that "[a]ppellant cites no authority for this position and we are
not persuaded by his argument" and further stated that the exercise of the govern-
ment's appeal right "does not necessarily violate a criminal defendant's right against
double jeopardy." 382 F.2d at 876-77. The court en banc ultimately asserted that it:
need not pursue the matter of constitutionality of government appeals in
that an appellate court's reconsideration of its own position on a question of
law, is far different from an appeal from a final decision of a trial court. As
long as this Court has jurisdiction over the cause, it has the express authority
[under a specified statute and rule] to rehear and, if necessary, modify its
decisions.
Id. at 877. Concluding that, "[o]bviously, an appellate court's reconsideration of its
legal opinion is completely unlike requiring a criminal defendant to stand trial a sec-
ond time on a factual issue after once being acquitted," the court decided it retained
"the jurisdiction necessary to question and change any tentative decisions of the
Court without subjecting appellant to any form of additional jeopardy." Id.
Spinelli's approach (basing its decision on the existence of statutory and rulejuris-
diction) appears to beg the issue since the defendant's claim would impliedly call into
question the constitutionality of any statutory or rule power granted the court to un-
dertake the en banc proceedings about which the defendant complained. In any
event, the court's narrow holding appears to indirectly sustain only the constitutional-
ity of the en banc rehearing. Only the more general statements of the court favorably
imply the constitutionality of prosecution appeals from one court to another.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (representing the key case
on this point).
8 See infra text accompanying note 18; Bitty, 208 U.S. at 393, discussed supra note
6; see also Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 249 (1981), quoted infra note 36.
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adverse judgment in an intermediate appellate court, yet the cases are
innumerable in which such second-tier appeals are pursued without
double jeopardy protestation. 9
The reason why double jeopardy is involved in prosecution ap-
peals does not, therefore, ultimately lie in concern about the nature
of the proceeding in the appellate court itself. What, then, is the pre-
cise importance of double jeopardy as a device for deciding appeala-
bility by the prosecution? The answer is found in the combination of
the double jeopardy prohibition with some additional and separate
principle which, at its base, will itself depend on ajurisdiction's own
law. That separate principle will be either (1) a jurisdiction's own
principle precluding advisory opinions, that flow from moot cases, or
(2) ajurisdiction's statutory formulation expressly linking prosecutor
appealability to double jeopardy. Absent one of these additional fac-
tors, double jeopardy protection precludes only further impermissible
trial-level jeopardy, but not a prosecution appeal.
II. ADVISORY OPINION BARS: MOOT CASES
In most jurisdictions the federal double jeopardy protection bars
certain prosecution appeals by combining with a jurisdiction's own
separate doctrine prohibiting advisory judicial opinions. Because of
local law election, this is the combination of principles that brings
double jeopardy into play in a great many states. (As will be seen, the
same would be true in all federal appeals but for the fact that the
existing statutory formulation of the government appeal right pres-
ently short-circuits the need for the federal courts to assert the federal
case-or-controversy doctrine barring advisory opinions.) In this com-
bination of principles, double jeopardy law becomes important be-
cause it affects the availability of the remedy that the prosecution is
seeking on the appeal: an appellate judgment permitting certain
problematic proceedings in the trial court. This remedy-the availa-
bility of which must be tested against the constraints of the Double
Jeopardy Clause-in turn becomes implicated because of the inter-
play of a second doctrine: the widespread doctrine that a court will
refuse to render advisory opinions (a doctrine usually devised from a
jurisdiction's interpretation of its case-or-controversy requirement). It
9 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (discussing how the prose-
cution successfully sought Supreme Court certiorari review after state appellate court
rendered judgment for defendant); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)
(same); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (involving Supreme Court certio-
rari review at government's request following lower appellate court judgment for
defendant).
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is the combination of the double jeopardy doctrine and the advisory
opinion doctrine that ultimately accounts for the central role of
double jeopardy issues in many appellate opinions considering mo-
tions to dismiss prosecution appeals. In combination, these doctrines
present a question of the appellate court's jurisdiction to reach the
underlying claim advanced by the prosecutor.
The 1909 Supreme Court case, United States v. Evans,10 illustrates
the relationship of these two principles. Evans was not decided on
constitutional grounds that bind the fifty states, but it is nevertheless
important because the Supreme Court's reasoning has persuasive ap-
plication to all jurisdictions which ban advisory opinions."' The case
involved a statute applicable to prosecution appeals in the District of
Columbia. On its face, the statute afforded the prosecution the same
right of appeal as the defendant, "[p ] rovided, [t] hat if on such appeal
it shall be found that there was error in the rulings of the court during
the trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside."
12
The lower appeals court interpreted the statute as not intended by
Congress to authorize appeals in situations when further proceedings
would be barred by double jeopardy.13 This conclusion rested on the
observation that such an appeal was essentially moot because the de-
fendant had no interest in the appeal and could not be made to par-
ticipate.1 4 The Supreme Court noted this recognition of the adverse
10 213 U.S. 297 (1909).
11 Evans was decided shortly after the congressional debate on the 1907 federal
appeals statute, a debate in which many legislators appeared to ignore concerns about
the case-or-controversy requirement in the context of double jeopardy situations (see
infra text accompanying notes 24-25). Evans is not entirely clear about whether the
Court was deciding the case as a matter of local District of Columbia law (over which
the Supreme Court then maintained general supervisory power) or as a general mat-
ter of federal law applicable to all federal courts. In any event, by upholding the
statutory interpretation made by the local appeals court (the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia) and expressly addressing only the statutory interpretation issue
to which the lower court had limited itself, see Evans, 213 U.S. at 301, the Court
avoided a direct ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Nevertheless, it is ap-
parent that the federal advisory opinion doctrine, discussed in Evans, would apply in
any federal case today (see infra note 34 and accompanying text) were it necessary to
face the constitutional advisory opinion issue in a federal case.
12 Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 935, 31 Stat. 1189, 1341, quoted in Evans, 213
U.S. at 299.
13 United States v. Evans, 30 App. D.C. 58, 62 (1907).
14 Id. at 61. The court wrote:
The appellee in such a case, having been freed from further prosecution by
the verdict in his favor, has no interest in the question that may be deter-
mined in the proceedings on appeal and may not even appear. Nor can his
appearance be enforced. Without opposing argument, which is so impor-
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implications of reading the statute to allow appeals in the face of a
double jeopardy bar and concluded that the lower court's reading of
the statute was a reading sustained by the federal advisory opinion
doctrine.'
5
Evans thus exemplifies an important general point: if a prosecu-
tion appeal is seeking a remedy prohibited by double jeopardy law,
then the case becomes one in which the appellate court would be
rendering an advisory opinion on the underlying merits of the prose-
cution appeal.
tant to the attainment of a correct conclusion, the court is called upon to lay
down rules that may be of vital interest to persons who may hereafter be
brought to trial. All such persons are entitled to be heard on all questions
affecting their rights, and it is a harsh rule that would bind them by decisions
made in what are practically "moot" cases, where opposing views have not
been presented.
Id. In fact, the reports of the case indicate that counsel appeared for the defendant in
the D.C. Court of Appeals, but not in the Supreme Court. See id. at 60; Evans, 213
U.S. at 298. Whether the defendant was indigent or represented by retained counsel
is not indicated, so it is unclear from the reports whether the absence of counsel in
the Supreme Court resulted from a considered defense decision or a lack of an ap-
pointment of counsel. The idea that the defense side of the argument may go unrep-
resented (at least on the merits of the prosecutor's appeal) is further discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
15 Evans, 213 U.S. at 301. See also United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 323
(1892), interpreting an early federal statute as not allowing government appeal and
noting,
[i]n none of the provisions of this act, defining the appellate jurisdiction,
either of this court or of the Circuit Court of Appeals, is there any indication
of an intention to confer upon the United States the right to bring up a
criminal case of any grade after judgment below in favor of the defendant.
It is impossible to presume an intention on the part of Congress to make so
serious and far-reaching an innovation in the criminal jurisprudence of the
United States.
Id.
The Supreme Court's "advisory opinion" terminology has been used throughout
this Article for convenience. In contrast to the early American "advisory opinion"
problem, which had to do with legislation, see infra note 45, courts (including the
Evans Court) sometimes now use the term "advisory opinion" in a broader sense,
applying it to a variety of nonjusticiability problems, including the one discussed in
this Article. See generally CHAL.S ALAN WPiuom ET AL., FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3529.1, at 296 (1984). More particularly, the underlying nonjusticiability
problem involved in this Article might be characterized as a mootness problem, with
the acquittal preventing the appellate court from further affecting the relationship of
the parties to each other.
1997]
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Evans has been cited from time to time for various propositions,1 6
but the relationship between double jeopardy and advisory opinions
so distinctly articulated in Evans has not been as clearly noted in re-
cent cases, including the only Supreme Court decision involving the
relationship of a double jeopardy problem and a state prosecution
appeal.' 7 For reasons discussed below, Evans' precise conceptual basis
for implicating double jeopardy becomes particularly informative and
important when the prosecution is attempting to appeal in a state
case.
III. STATUTORY BARs IMPLICATING DouBLE JEOPARDY
Appeals are considered a creature of statute or, in some states, a
creature of state constitutional law. As such, it is generally said that
without express statutory authorization to appeal the prosecution en-
joys no such right.18 Statutory language in a particular jurisdiction
16 Most of these citations relate to the general advisory opinion aspect of the case,
to other discrete aspects of prosecution appeals, or to the role of appellate courts.
For example, the case has been cited for the proposition that advisory opinions are
not allowed in the proper exercise of a particular court's judicial power, see, e.g.,
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 504 (1974) (concurring opinion cites Evans for
proposition that the Court is powerless to render an advisory opinion); Alabama State
Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (noting that "[t]his Court is
without power to give advisory opinions"); or for the proposition that there are limita-
dons on prosecutor appeal rights, see, e.g., United States v. Hastings, 296 U.S. 188, 194
(1935) (citing Evans for the assertion that the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 was en-
acted and government appeals subjected to prescribed limitations "in the light of con-
siderations governing the exercise of the judicial power"); United States v. Burroughs,
289 U.S. 159, 162 n.5 (1933) (citing holding of D.C. Court of Appeals that the proviso
was ineffective to affect the government's review of alleged errors in the course of a
trial resulting in an acquittal); State v. Muolo, 172 A. 875, 876 (Conn. 1934) (noting
that without any constitutional or statutory provision expressly conferring such power,
the state's right to appeal in a criminal case is denied in the great majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions); or for other miscellaneous propositions, see, e.g., Carroll v. United
States, 354 U.S. 394, 406, 407 n.21 (1957) (observing that the effect of the D.C. pro-
viso involved in Evans "was to preclude entirely the taking of an appeal by the govern-
ment after a verdict for the defendant" and noting that even when the government
does have the right to appeal much of its appeal will be "swallowed up in the sanctity
of the jury's verdict"); State v. Keep, 409 P.2d 321, 323 (Alaska 1965) (citing Evans to
support interpretation that the state statute provides only limited instances in which
the appeal of an acquittal is permissible, and noting that a verdict in favor of the
defendant cannot be set aside).
17 See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986), discussed infra in text accompa-
nying notes 50-62.
18 The case most often cited for this proposition is United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310 (1892). See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975) (stating that
"this Court early held that the Government could not take an appeal in a criminal
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may itself make double jeopardy relevant by using it as a limiting pro-
viso. This is the situation, for example, with regard to the present
federal statute governing prosecutor appeals.
A. Federal Statutory Bar
The 1970 federal statute allows certain government appeals but
makes those appeals expressly contingent on whether double jeop-
ardy would preclude further proceedings:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court
of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court
dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial af-
ter verdict orjudgment, as to any one or more counts, except that no
appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Consti-
tution prohibits further prosecution.1 9
case without express statutory authority"); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246
(1981) (articulating rule as a "presumption" against prosecution appeals absent an
express statute); State v. Insley, 606 So. 2d 600, 602 (Miss. 1992) (citing Sanges in
connection with determination that state statute did not authorize appeal of the par-
ticular trial court action involved). While expressly interpreting the federal prosecu-
tion right to appeal, Sanges also extensively reviews the history of prosecution appeals,
both in English law and in the early state cases. Sanges was a statutory interpretation
case, with the Court subsequently stating that, "[nio doubt of the power of Congress
is intimated in [Sanges]." Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120, 127 (1907).
The Supreme Court's insistence on a statutory basis for a federal prosecution
appeal is consistent with Supreme Court case law requiring that other federal appeal
rights be premised on positive law. The Court's dictum in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 688 (1894), asserting that a defendant has no federal due process right to appeal
in a criminal case, has been relied upon in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffit,
417 U. S. 600, 606 (1974) (citing cases); see also National Union of Marine Cooks &
Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954) (citing McKane to support conclusion that
there is no constitutional right of appeal in civil cases and further stating that the
right to review is not required by the Due Process Clause). Under this view, the states
are not federally bound to provide a system of appellate court review. Of course, a
state may provide a constitutional, as well as a statutory, right to a defense appeal or to
a prosecution appeal. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have ... the right to appeal in all cases. .. ."); Txx. CONsT. art. 5,
§ 26 ("The state is entitled to appeal in criminal cases, as authorized by general law.").
19 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994) (emphasis added; irrelevant subsections omitted).
This formulation has remained unchanged since it was passed by Congress in 1970
and signed by the President on January 2, 1971. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (1971). Amendments to other
parts of § 3731 (unrelated to this article) were made in 1986 and 1994. See Criminal
Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 32, 100
Stat. 3592 (relating to appeal of certain release rulings); Title XXXII of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 322, § 330008(4), 108
Stat. 1796, 2142 (making typographical correction).
1997]
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B. The Background of the Present Statute
The 1970 act was created against the background of earlier diffi-
culties with the first Criminal Appeals Act, enacted in 1907.20 It is
tempting to presuppose that the present federal scheme-expressly
precluding certain appeals when double jeopardy bars further prose-
cution-was the product of a deliberate legislative attempt to incorpo-
rate the tandem effect of the federal advisory opinion concept
demonstrated by the Evans case. However, neither the history of the
1970 act nor of its 1907 predecessor establishes nonjusticiability as a
paramount concern for the statutory inclusion of double jeopardy
notions.
The relevant final language of the 1970 act was the product of a
conference committee report that did not explain the change in sub-
stituting the ultimately enacted present proviso.21 An assumption that
The statute has been read as legislatively intended to expand prosecutor appeals
to the fullest extent not prohibited by the double jeopardy boundary. See United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975) ("While the language of the new Act is not
dispositive, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended to remove all
statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitu-
tion would permit."). Despite the contrary view articulated byJustice Stevens that this
conclusion was not subjected to appropriate Supreme Court airing and that it does
not accord with legislative history, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 576-81 (1977) (concurring opinion), the Wilson view has prevailed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 85 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 363 (1975).
20 Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. The statutory problems
are prominently exhibited, for example, in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970),
and described in S. REP. No. 91-1296 (1970) (Report of the SenateJudiciary Commit-
tee on S. 3132, involving the 1970 act's revision of the 1907 act). See also Wilson, 420
U.S. at 336-39 (1975).
Minor changes, not relevant here, were made subsequent to 1907 and before the
revision in the 1970 act. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 58, 63 Stat. 89, 97; Tide
VIII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. 197, 237.
21 This final conference version, reconciling differences between the House and
Senate versions of the bill, added the present proviso, "except that no appeal shall lie
where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution," in place of earlier and different limiting language that had been
amended into the bill, but the significance of the changes is not addressed in the
conference report or other legislative history. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 91-1768, at 10
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5842, 5848 (accompanying H.R. 17825); see also
116 CONG. REc. 42196 (1970) (House floor presentation of conference result); 116
CONG. REc. 42039 (1970) (Senate floor presentation of conference result). The ear-
lier language had allowed appeal of certain dismissals or terminations "except that no
appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal." See S. REP. No. 91-1296, at 1-2 (1970)
(containing the earlier language of the Senate version that was ultimately deleted);
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a legislative concern about advisory opinions consciously motivated
the addition of the proviso is not supported by the silent conference
committee report. Nor is it supported by the earlier Senate Judiciary
Committee report which itself did not clearly focus on nonjusticiabil-
ity problems.2 2 Moreover, such an assumption is questionable in light
of the example provided by the confusing legislative history of the
present statute's 1907 predecessor.
C. The Criminal Appeals Act of 1907
The 1907 Criminal Appeals Act 23 was the first government ap-
peals statute and engendered debate among legislators at a time when
double jeopardy law was considerably less developed than today. The
legislative debate did grapple with some double jeopardy issues, but it
dealt with justiciability issues only sparingly and unclearly. In fact,
there is reason to believe that the legislative struggle with the 1907
statute's allusion to double jeopardy concepts may have resulted prin-
cipally from a desire to underscore the notion that Congress was not
somehow trying to sanction reprosecution of acquitted defendants.
24
116 CONG. REC. 35658 (1970) (Senate presentation of floor report). Senate language
allowing appeals from an order "terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant,"
see id., was also deleted in the final conference version. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-
1768, at 10 (1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 42036, 42039 (1970); 116 CONG. REc.
42039 (1970) (Senate floor presentation of conference result). The amendment to
§ 3731 was finally enacted as part of the extensive Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1880, 1890 (1971). More easily accessible
summaries of the legislative history can be found in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 338-39 (1975), and in the concurring opinion in United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 576-81 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring), discussed in supra
note 19.
22 See S. REP. No. 91-1296, at 1-2 (1970).
23 Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
24 For years, proponents of government appeals had argued against reposing in
one judge the unreviewable power to end a prosecution. Impetus to the argument
for authorizing government appeals of some sort was delivered by means of a promi-
nent district court ruling ending an antitrust prosecution. See FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 113-19 (1928) (containing an
account of the legislative history of the statute); Philip B. Kurland, The Mersky Case
and the Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. CHI. L. REv
419, 446-49 (1961) (citing various reports of the Attorneys General from 1892-1907);
United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. fll. 1906) (invalidating indictment
and directing a verdict while jury was deliberating). As finally passed, the 1907 act
essentially provided that the government could appeal from a decision dismissing an
indictment or arresting judgment when the decision was based on "the invalidity, or
construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded." Criminal Appeals
Actof 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. It also authorized appeals from a decision sus-
taining a special plea in bar if the defendant had not been put in jeopardy. On the
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The possibility that the bill would result in moot appellate cases was
only briefly touched upon in the Senate floor debates and then only
in response to suggested changes. 25 Indeed, this legislative debate
over the 1907 act was criticized for missing the import of the constitu-
tional case-or-controversy requirement.
2 6
other hand, the 1907 statute expressly provided that the prosecution could not obtain
a writ of error "in any case where there has been a verdict in favor of the defendant."
Id.
Suggestions to amend the bill and varied interpretations were plentiful during its
consideration. Some of the legislation's senatorial supporters asserted that its intent
was to allow review of lower court decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional with-
out infringing on defendants' rights. See 41 CONG. REc. 2190 (1907). A good deal of
debate centered on various double jeopardy notions not related to mootness and with
drafting attempts to deal with these concepts. See id. at 2190-97, 2744-63, 2818-25.
Several senators saw the proposed legislation as open to allowing retrials following
acquittals and as an impermissible intrusion on defendants' rights. Id. at 2190. The
view was expressed that the idea of "jeopardy" was then difficult to define, id. at 2746,
with the rare voice noting that it was impossible for Congress to constitutionally au-
thorize that a defendant be placed twice injeopardy. Id. at 2759. Some supporters of
the bill argued that it should not be interpreted as allowing reindictment after jeop-
ardy had attached, and they indicated that the jeopardy language was included from
an abundance of caution, in order to guard against such an interpretation. Id. at
2191.
25 For example, when some proposed that the bill be framed in such a way that
the defendant would have no further contact with the case, a few senators objected
that this would result in a moot case beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
id. at 2745, 2821.
Modeling his proposal on several state statutes, Senator Rayner unsuccessfully
proposed that in certain cases the trial courtjudgment "shall not be reversed or in any
manner affected, but the decision of the Supreme Court shall determine the law to
govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered
or which may afterwards arise." Id. at 2745. Senator Nelson observed that this would
make the case moot. Id. Senator Spooner argued that appeals following the grant of
a motion in arrest ofjudgment would create a situation in which a question would be
put to the Supreme Court, while constitutional jurisprudence prohibited such a rul-
ing. Id. at 2821. The succeeding cloudy debate included some supposition that con-
tinuing a defendant's bail after a dismissal order would keep the case from becoming
moot. Id. at 2822.
The issue of moot cases earned somewhat more dramatic attention in the House,
given the position of Representative Jenkins who argued for a formulation that would
allow the government to obtain a Supreme Court opinion on questions of law while
freeing acquitted defendants. He asserted that "[i]t does not make any difference to
me whether it is a moot case or not; the Department ofJustice and the President of
the United States have asked that the House bill become a law." Id. at 3046.
26 See Kurland, supra note 24, at 451 n.159 (asserting that "Congressional igno-
rance of the case or controversy requirement in the federal courts is demonstrated
over and over again in this legislative history" of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907).
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D. The Limiting Effect of the Present Federal Formulation
It is important to see that the proviso language in the present
federal statute is conceptually superfluous as a limiting device protect-
ing against nonjusticiable appeals, whatever the congressional intent
behind the double jeopardy limitation and however helpful the pro-
viso may be in focusing the federal courts' attention on the double
jeopardy segment of the problem. In light of the constitutional ban
on federal court advisory opinions, the same appeal-barring result
would obtain in federal courts whether or not the double jeopardy
language appeared in the statute. Neither of the tandem constitu-
tional doctrines involved can be overridden by statute.
E. State Statutory Bars
By the 1930s, a significant number of state legislatures had en-
acted statutes purporting to grant their prosecutors a right to ap-
peal. 27 This development was well under way before the 1969
application of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause to the states and
the present expansion of federal double jeopardy law in state cases.
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As a result, some of these state statutes were expansively written with-
out concern for present federal double jeopardy law concepts. Suc-
cessor state statutes now allow for prosecution appeals in varying
degrees and sometimes bear the influence of earlier unfettered lan-
guage. However, just as the federal statute makes double jeopardy
statutorily relevant to appealability, a number of states statutorily limit
prosecution appeals by express reference to double jeopardy protec-
tion. The language in some of these statutes more accurately fits with
27 See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1208-11 (Official Draft 1930) (collecting
statutes).
28 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Coincidentally enough, Benton
overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in which the Court had held that
the general Due Process Clause, as distinguished from the Double Jeopardy Clause,
did not bar reprosecution of a defendant for a greater crime of which he had been
impliedly acquitted, following a successful prosecution appeal daiming trial error.
The change wrought by the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the
states is dramatized by a comparison of the pre-incorporation literature, much of
which now has been severely undercut by the change in constitutional law. Compare
William H. Skelton, Comment, State Appeals in Criminal Cases, 32 TENN. L. REv. 449,
449 (1965) (noting that "most authorities agree that an appeal should be allowed
from a verdict or judgment of acquittal") (footnote omitted), with Shellenberger &
Strazzella, supra note 2, at 152-70 (collecting the long line of federal cases holding
that acquittals are not subject to reversal and retrial).
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the true appellate effect of prohibited second jeopardy.29 Michigan,
for example, allows certain prosecution appeals if the federal or state
constitutional protection against double jeopardy "would not bar fur-
ther proceedings against the defendant."30 Other state statutes, how-
ever, somehow recognize the importance of double jeopardy as a
limiting doctrine, but the exact relationship is not quite accurately
reflected and the linguistic fit of the concepts is awkward, given that
the double jeopardy protection does not directly apply to the appel-
late court proceeding.
3 '
29 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.12(1) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing prosecu-
tion appeal "if the protection against double jeopardy under... [the state and federal
constitutions] would not bar further proceedings against the defendant"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 547.200(2) (West 1987) (amended by 1997 Mo. Legis. Serv. 132 (West)) (con-
taining a residual authorization for prosecution appeals in all criminal cases beyond
those specified elsewhere, "except in those cases where the possible outcome of such
an appeal would result in double jeopardy for the defendant"); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1445 (1988 & Supp. 1996) (granting prosecution an appeal from certain ac-
tions "[u) nless the rule against double jeopardy prohibits further prosecution"); see
also ALAsKA STAT. § 22.15.240 (Michie 1996) (generally providing that the "state's
right of appeal in criminal cases is limited by the prohibition against double jeopardy
contained in the" federal and state constitutions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102
(Supp. 1996) (affording prosecution appeal but further stating that "[n]othing in this
section shall authorize placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same
offense"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020 (4) (c) (Banks-Baldwin 1991) (providing that
in cases where prosecution appeals are authorized, court may reverse and order new
trial "in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy").
30 MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 770.12 (1) & (2) (West Supp. 1997).
31 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2115-A(2) (West 1964) (allowing certain pros-
ecution appeals "when an appeal of the order would be permitted by the double
jeopardy provisions" of the federal or state constitutions); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 974.05(1) (a) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for prosecution appeal "from any
[flinal order or judgment adverse to the state ... if the appeal would not be prohib-
ited by constitutional protections against double jeopardy").
A legislature's particular formulation of the statutory list of trial court actions
from which the prosecution is permitted to appeal can itself avoid (or minimize) the
need to address concerns about second jeopardy problems because the formulation
can be limited to trial court actions that are unlikely to present anyjeopardy problem.
For example, a jurisdiction may limit appeals, in whole or in part, to pre-jeopardy
actions or to post-verdict actions (such as the suppression of evidence, the grant of a
new trial, or some sentencing issue). See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-103 (1995);
TEx. CODE CRIm. P. ANN. art. 44.01(a) (West Supp. 1997);. see also MD. CODE ANN.,
OTs. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302(c) (3) (ii) (1995) (providing generally that state appeal
.shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the defendant"). Some prosecution ap-
peal statutes avoid at least one class of double jeopardy problems by expressly provid-
ing that the prosecution cannot appeal from a verdict of acquittal. See, e.g., ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 6 (guaranteeing in general an appeal of right "except that after a
trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of
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On the other hand, some state statutory language seems to call
for advisory opinions in cases that have become moot by virtue of
double jeopardy bars. The invitation is sometimes overt.32 In other
statutes the invitation is implicit because the statutes sweepingly au-
thorize prosecution appeals or specifically authorize appeal even in
situations in which federal double jeopardy law now clearly prohibits
further trial court prosecution.33 All the statutes which seemingly al-
acquittal"); LA. CODE CrM. PROC. ANN. art. 912(B) (West 1996) (providing that "state
cannot appeal from verdict of acquittal").
32 Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming provide examples. In Ken-
tucky, the state's constitutional provision allows prosecution appeal "except that the
Commonwealth may not appeal from ajudgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other
than for the purpose of securing a certification of law .... " Ky. CONST. § 115. Statu-
tory law further provides that in cases in which prosecution appeals are authorized,
the court may reverse and order a new trial "in any case in which a new trial would not
constitute double jeopardy." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020(4) (c) (Banks-Baldwin
1991). This bundle of Kentucky law is interpreted in Commonwealth v. Littrell 677
S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1984), and Thompson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1983) (ren-
dering opinion on claimed trial judge error raised by prosecution's certification fol-
lowing defendant's trial acquittal). (Thompson's conclusion on a point not implicating
the certification procedure was overruled in Shannon v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548
(Ky. 1989).) MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-103(b) (1994) provides that the prosecution
may appeal a judgment acquitting the defendant when a question of law has been
decided adversely to the state, but the appeal shall not subject the defendant to fur-
ther prosecution nor reverse the judgment of acquittal. NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 29-2319
(1995) provides as to some prosecution-initiated reviews that the judgment of the trial
court shall not be reversed or affected, but the decision of the reviewing district court
"shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the
time the decision is rendered, or which may thereafter arise in the district." In afford-
ing the prosecution a possible review under a discretionary bill of exceptions follow-
ing an acquittal, while precluding a remedy in the case, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-
104(b) (Michie 1997), Wyoming also offers a prime example of an advisory opinion
system. The Wyoming situation is discussed more extensively infra text accompanying
notes 40-43.
33 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-12-102(1) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that pros-
ecution may appeal any trial court decision upon any question of law but expressly
disclaiming authorization for placing defendant in second jeopardy); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (West 1996) (authorizing state appeals from a ruling of law "aris-
ing on the trial of criminal cases... in the same manner and to the same effect as if
made by the accused," if permitted by presiding judge); IND. CODE § 35-38-4-2(4)
(Michie 1994) (affording prosecution appeal "[ulpon a question reserved by the
state, if the defendant is acquitted"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 814.5(2) (d) (West 1994) (au-
thorizing a discretionary appeal from a "final judgment or order raising a question of
law important to the judiciary and the profession"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.015(1) (b) (Michie 1995) (purporting to allow prosecution to appeal grant of a
motion to acquit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1053(3) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing a
prosecution appeal "[u] pon a question reserved by the state"). For examples of cases
arising under these statutes, see infra note 40.
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low advisory opinions in the face of a double jeopardy bar against fur-
ther prosecution graphically illustrate the importance of sorting out
the precise relationship of double jeopardy to prosecution appeals.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALLOWING STATE APPEALS DESPITE A
DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR TO FURTHER PROSECUTION
Those state statutes allowing a prosecution appeal despite a
double jeopardy bar to further trial court proceedings present several
distinct questions. There is, first of all, a state law issue concerning
whether any given statute conflicts with a state's own constitution-a
purely state law question open to different answers from state to state.
The separate question is whether such statutes inherently violate
the federal constitution-a federal question and one with a present
answer. For federal courts, the Supreme Court of the United States
long ago decided that rendering an advisory opinion is not a valid
exercise of the federal judicial power.34 State courts, however, are not
confined by the federal courts' rigid Article III "case or controversy"
requirement. In a state case, the question of whether federal double
jeopardy would prohibit a remedy to the prosecution is itself a matter of
federal constitutional law,35 but the separate question of whether the
state court can render an advisory opinion is a question of only state
law concerning the functioning of that state's courts.
36
34 See, e.g., Local No. 8-6 Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367
(1960); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909) (citing United States v. Fer-
reira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 (1851), and Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409
(1792)). The federal advisory opinion doctrine is considered an aspect of the consti-
tutional power of the federal courts, which is limited to deciding cases or controver-
sies. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (containing an
extensive collection of related principles and cases). In the federal system, to avoid
becoming moot a case must remain an actual controversy at each stage of review. See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1068 (1997) (involving a
civil case that became moot the day before the appeal was filed).
35 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that the states must
abide by federal Double Jeopardy Clause). Under the Supremacy Clause, the state
courts must provide at least a minimum federal double jeopardy protection. See U.S.
CONSr. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
36 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988)
(pointing out that "the special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes
on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts" and
concluding that the "States are thus left free as a matter of their own procedural law
to determine whether their courts may issue advisory opinions or determine matters
that would not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal court that an
actual 'case' or 'controversy' be presented for resolution"); Secretary of State v. Jo-
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As do the federal courts, a majority of state courts generally de-
cline to issue advisory opinions as a matter of state law, or at least
express a reluctance to issue them.37 This aversion to advisory opin-
seph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 971 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing
that "[n]othing in Art. III of the Federal Constitution prevents the [state appellate
court] from rendering an advisory opinion concerning the constitutionality of [state]
legislation if it considers it appropriate to do so"); see also Arizona v. Manypenny, 451
U.S. 232 (1981), stating broadly,
The decision to limit or extend a State's appellate authority is a matter of
state law within constitutional constraints. If a state wishes to empower its
prosecutors to pursue a criminal appeal under certain conditions, it is free
to so provide, limited only by guarantees afforded the criminal defendant
under the Constitution.
Id. at 249. See also Evans, 213 U.S. at 300, which itself noted that, unlike federal
courts, some state courts are required to give answers to questions put to them by
state legislatures or executives. On the particular type of advisory opinion mentioned
in Evans, see infra note 45.
Some scholars have unsuccessfully urged a limited federal exception to the states'
freedom to give advisory opinions, arguing that when the underlying issue with which
the advisory opinion will concern itself is a federal issue, state justiciability doctrines
should be narrowed in certain ways and made to conform to the federal case-or-con-
troversy doctrine. SeeWilliam A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy"Requirement in State
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. Rav. 263, 263-64, 265 n.7 (1990)
(collecting authorities while acknowledging that the long-held Supreme Court view is
to the contrary). In the situation discussed in the present Article, the underlying
claim(s) presented by the prosecution appeal might turn on federal constitutional law
or might well be confined to state law issues.
37 See, e.g., Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Services,
712 P.2d 914, 919 (Ariz. 1985) (stating that Arizona courts do not issue advisory opin-
ions as a matter of restraint, even in the absence of a state constitutional mandate);
Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Kenworthy, 322 S.E.2d 720,
723 (Ga. 1984) (stating that the court "has in the past generally refused to issue advi-
sory opinions"); Mahial v. Suwa, 742 P.2d 359, 364 (Haw. 1987) (indicating that
courts are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract questions of law); St. Charles Gam-
ing Co. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 648 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (La. 1995) (stating, in
the context of a civil penalties case, that courts will not decide moot controversies or
render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies); Webb v. Joyce Real Es-
tate, 672 A.2d 660, 665 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) ("We may not render advisory
opinions."); In re Workmen's Compensation Fund, 119 N.E. 1027, 1028 (N.Y. 1918)
(stating that courts do not give advisory opinions); Siders v. Reynoldsburg Sch. Dist.,
650 N.E.2d 150, 163 (Ohio 1994) (announcing that "this court does not have the
constitutional or statutory authorization to issue advisory opinions"); Brown v. Ore-
gon State Bar, 648 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1982) (declaring that "in the absence of
constitutional authority, the court cannot render advisory opinions"); Sotelo v. State,
931 S.W.2d 745, 746 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996, n.w.h.) (noting that the "courts of ap-
peals and the Court of Criminal Appeals are without authority to issue advisory opin-
ions"); State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983) (stating that an advisory
opinion on appeal from acquittal is beyond the court's power).
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ions is not universal, however. Sometimes expressly and sometimes by
implication, a number of state appellate courts have indicated a will-
ingness to render advisory opinions in cases arising from the lower
courts.3 8 Moreover, some courts generally prohibiting advisory opin-
ions declare an exception in unusual circumstances.3 9 This formula-
38 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 931 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Ark. 1996) (declaring trial
court error on prosecution appeal while acknowledging that double jeopardy rights
prevent retrial); State v. Bailey, 523 A.2d 535, 538 (Del. 1987) (implying that under a
particular statute allowing appeal by leave of supreme court, prosecutor could appeal
without prejudice to post-verdict acquittal); State v. Huggins, 665 P.2d 1053, 1054
(Idaho 1983) (although double jeopardy barred retrial following state appeal, court
nevertheless renders ruling recognizing that "[i]n a sense, our opinion today is advi-
sory"); State v. McKissack, 625 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
"[w]hen a defendant has been acquitted and the State appeals a reserved question of
law, only questions of law are considered by this court, as a way to furnish guidance to
trial courts in future cases"); In re R.G.M., 575 P.2d 645, 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)
(stating that an appeal by prosecution on a reserved question of law may "be taken
from an acquittal of the defendant or from an order of the court authorized by law
which expressly bars further prosecution"); see also cases cited infra notes 40, 43. State
cases sometimes contain broad disclaimers against advisory opinions in other contexts
but courts nevertheless issue them under the narrower circumstances of the statutes
discussed in this Article. E.g., compare State v. McCormick, 523 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Neb.
1994) (noting generally that the court does not issue advisory opinions), with State v.
Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error on statutory appeal in
directed verdict and noting that double jeopardy bars retrial).
39 See, e.g., Hayes v. Charney, 693 P.2d 831, 834 (Alaska 1985) (discussing public
interest exception to mootness doctrine that normally precludes advisory opinions);
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 352-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that
court will not issue advisory opinions or review moot or abstract questions, but noting
that exceptions to the moot question doctrine exist, inter alia, when the question is
capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review or in the rare case when an
appeal concerns questions of great public importance); State v. Montgomery, 929
S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (declaring that Tennessee "recognizes two
exceptions to the mootness doctrine," one dealing with an error capable of repetition
but which may evade appellate review and another if the issue is of great public inter-
est and is important to the administration ofjustice); In reM.C., 915 S.W.2d 118, 119
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996, n.w.h.) (declaring that the court's role does not include deliver-
ing advisory opinions in cases that are moot but noting an exception for issues capa-
ble of repetition but evading review); see also IowA CODE ANN. § 814.5(2) (d) (West
1994) (authorizing a discretionary appeal from a "final judgment and order raising a
question of law important to the judiciary and the profession"), interpreted in State v.
Kase, 339 N.W.2d 157, 158 (Iowa 1983) (stating that a moot appeal will be heard even
though acquittal was entered because the issue involved a question of public impor-
tance that was likely to recur and was in need of authoritative interpretation), and
State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1981) (finding that defendant who was
convicted of lesser included offense could not again be put in jeopardy for greater
offense but then finding error in trial court's ruling); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3602(b) (3) (1995) (allowing state appeal on questions reserved following final judg-
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tion might allow room for prosecutors to argue that an important and
recurring trial level concern, which may well normally lead to acquit-
tals, needs appellate resolution limited to prospective cases even if
double jeopardy law prevents application of the solution to the instant
case.
Many of the statutes clearly allowing prosecution appeals in moot
cases have been regular vehicles for prosecution appeals.40 Wyoming
represents a leading example of such a legislative authorization for
review of prosecution-raised issues in situations in which doublejeop-
ardy law would preclude further prosecution, combined with judicial
compliance with the authorizing statute, thereby producing advisory
rulings limited to future cases. The Wyoming statutory scheme af-
ment), interpreted in State v. Crozier, 587 P.2d 331, 335-36 (Kan. 1978) (demonstrat-
ing that the question must be one sufficient to aid in correct and uniform
administration of criminal law).
40 For examples of cases arising under the statutes cited in supra notes 32-33, see
People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1983) (finding that prosecution's statutory
appeal of directed acquittal involved a question of law meeting applicable standards
regarding future clarity of law and disapproving of judgment while acknowledging
that double jeopardy prevented reprosecution); State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207
(Iowa 1981) (concluding that a defendant who was convicted of a lesser included
offense could not again be put in jeopardy for the greater offense but finding error in
trial court's ruling); State v. McKissack, 625 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that "only questions of law are considered.., as a way to furnish guidance to
trial courts in future cases," even though acquittal bars further prosecution of defend-
ant); State v. Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error in directed
verdict while noting that double jeopardy bars retrial); State v. Young, 874 P.2d 57, 58
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (finding trial court error while concluding that the trial
court action barred further prosecution). The Mississippi statute, Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-35-103(b) (1994), has been read to distinguish between pure issues of law (ap-
pealable) and other issues involving fact. See, e.g., State v. Insley, 606 So. 2d 600, 602
(Miss. 1992) (collecting cases that hold that the statute does not authorize prosecu-
tion appeals of insufficiency of evidence issues); State v. Thornhill, 171 So. 2d 308,
312 (Miss. 1965) (finding defendant's acquittal barred reprosecution but still consid-
ering prosecution's claim of trial error regarding admission of evidence).
Conversely, the Nevada statute, see NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 177.015 (1) (b) (Michie
1995), was held unconstitutional in State v. V'rts, 469 P.2d 53, 54 (Nev. 1970), which
decided that legislative attempt to have court decide moot questions following an
acquittal was beyond the constitutional power granted to the court. Considering a
prosecution attempt to appeal under the Connecticut statute, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-96 (West 1996), the state supreme court concluded that the contested trial
court action was an acquittal and therefore "double jeopardy bars [the court] from
considering the state's claim .. . ." State v. Paolella, 554 A.2d 702, 711 (Conn. 1989).
The court made no reference to the tandem principle that moot cases producing
advisory opinions will not be decided, an established proposition evident in other
Connecticut opinions. See, e.g., Carothers v. Capozziello, 574 A.2d 1268, 1285 (Conn.
1990) (citing earlier case law).
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fords the prosecution a limited possibility of review by means of a bill
of exceptions,41 and further calls for advisory opinions by mandating
that the appellate court's decision:
shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be
pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may after-
wards arise in the state, but shall not reverse nor in any manner
affect the judgment of the court in the case in which the bill of
exceptions was taken.42
The statute has played a part in a number of Wyoming cases deciding
the extent of prosecutorial rights in the context of advisory
opinions.43
Once there has been the requisite final decision that doublejeop-
ardy bars further trial court prosecution, none of the state advisory
opinion schemes appear to place any notable burden on a defendant
to participate. Because this point is obscured in some cases, this ob-
41 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-101 to 104 (Michie 1997). For discussions of some
aspects of Wyoming appeal mechanisms, see generally Gerald M. Gallivan, Supreme
Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint 20 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 159 (1985); Bradley Scott McKim, Case Note, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV.
723 (1985).
42 WvO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-104(b) (Michie 1997).
43 See e.g., Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230 (Wyo. 1994) (holding that Wyoming
statutes do not allow prosecution review by different mechanism of cross appeal);
State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1993) (finding error in trial court's refusal to give
prosecution-requested lesser included offense instruction while noting its decision
could not affect jury acquittal); State v. Stahl, 838 P.2d 1193 (Wyo. 1992) (following
dismissal of criminal complaint, court determined authority of officer to arrest); State
ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 85 P. 977 (Wyo. 1906) (refusing to take jurisdiction over bill
of exceptions that was not properly sealed as required by statute).
In other contexts, the Wyoming Supreme Court has sometimes declared an intol-
erance for advisory questions. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308, 311 (Wyo. 1982)
("We do not render advisory opinions."). At other times, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has expressed more flexibility about rendering them. See, e.g., Enberg v. State,
874 P.2d 890, 891-92 (Wyo. 1994) (supplying opinion sought by defendant and prose-
cution, after stating that "[i] t is a fundamental rule of appellate practice that advisory
opinions are rarely given" although there is some support for issuing them). The
state constitutionality of advisory opinions is not generally discussed in the Wyoming
cases involving a prosecutor's statutory bill of exceptions, but the cases often under-
score the statutory requirement that the court's present ruling will not affect the de-
fendant's own judgment. See, e.g., Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1124; Stah4 838 P.2d at 1194
(stating that court's "objective is to determine the law which will govern all similar
pending and future cases" but that it may not reverse or in any way affect the judg-
ment); see also State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368, 372-75 (Wyo. 1983) (concurring
opinion) (discussing constitutional provision and prosecution appeal rights in light of
double jeopardy protection).
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servation deserves some further clarification about when the case actu-
ally becomes moot.
A. The Timing in Moot Prosecution Appeals
Once it has been finally decided that a defendant cannot be sub-
jected to the prohibited second jeopardy, obviously the defendant is
no longer in any danger for the same offense. No longer having a
stake in the underlying claim involved in the appeal, the defendant
cannot be forced to further participate in the appeal.44 Such a de-
fendant cannot be conscripted any more than could any bystander be
conscripted to participate. Yet, even without that party's participa-
tion, some states might well choose to reach the underlying merits of
the prosecution's claim in an advisory opinion of this type. 45 In such
an appeal the defense position on the merits of the underlying
prosecutorial claim might go wholly or partially unexposed by an ad-
vocate's presentation. This is one of the possible dangers with any
moot appeal. It is not, however, necessarily true that the defense side
44 See supra note 14.
45 The particular type of advisory opinion involved in this Article arises on an
underlying prosecutorial claim of trial court error asserted to have occurred during
what was originally a live case or controversy, one with a concrete set of facts. How-
ever, the case then becomes a moot controversy between the parties at the point when
it is finally discerned that the double jeopardy bar operates. The power of a court to
render an advisory opinion in the context of a case in which the issue is no longer
justiciable should be distinguished from the power (or requirement) that a court may
(or must) give advisory answers to questions posed by other coordinate branches of
government, a type of advisory opinion mentioned in United States v. Evans, 213 U.S.
297 (1909). Some state constitutions (or even statutes) call for this latter type of
advisory opinion. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1995); COLO. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (1995); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. H; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
LXXIV; RI. CoNST. art. X, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. 8, § 5; see also In re Advisory Opinion,
335 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. 1985) (acknowledging prior practice of individual judges issuing
advisory opinions upon request of various government bodies but noting that such
single judge opinions are not binding); Fletcher, supra note 36, at 272.
The advisory opinion [historically] found in state court practices ... was
what one might call a true advisory opinion-the answer to a legal question
formally posed by a coordinate branch of government. The advisory opin-
ion that has become an issue in the twentieth century is different. This new
form of advisory opinion is not given in response to a formal request by a
coordinate branch of government; rather, it is an opinion rendered in a
litigated dispute in which a party is thought not to have a sufficient, or suffi-
ciently immediate, stake in the matter being litigated to make the court's
decision anything but advisory.
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of the underlying appeal claim will go unargued. Not only is it possi-
ble for most courts to appoint amicus curiae or to otherwise appoint
an attorney or attorney-organization to represent the defense posi-
tion, but this is what happens in practice in some states which allow
appeal when the case is moot because the defendant involved in the
particular case cannot be reprosecuted. 46
In situations contemplated by many prosecution appeals, the pre-
liminary jurisdictional issue is whether a double jeopardy bar to fur-
ther prosecution actually does exist, for example, whether there is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal. Until the double jeopardy point
is finally resolved in the defendant's favor (with all levels of prosecu-
tion appeal exhausted), the defendant actually does maintain a stake
in the appellate proceedings. For example, until the appellate courts
finally rule on an appellate court motion to dismiss (based on double
jeopardy concerns) the defendant must assert that double jeopardy
law mandates protection from further trial court prosecution. Of
course, that ruling is not always a foregone conclusion in a prosecu-
tion appeal from the trial court decision.47 The same is true with re-
gard to further possible prosecution appeals to a higher court
following an intermediate appellate court double jeopardy ruling that
was favorable to the defendant.
48
Put another way, these potentially moot appeals involve a first
step asking whether double jeopardy bars further trial court proceed-
ings (and thus bars the appeals court from granting a remedy). The
defendant maintains an interest in this initially live controversy, which
involves the application of double jeopardy law to the defendant's
case, until that double jeopardy claim is finally resolved in the defend-
ant's favor. A second question involves the merits of the prosecutor's
claim of error, asserted to have occurred in the trial court. The de-
fendant may or may not have a stake in this underlying claim, depend-
46 See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-103 (Michie 1997) (providing that if the prose-
cution is granted bill of exceptions, the trial judge shall "appoint a competent attor-
ney to argue the case against the state" and shall fix a reasonable fee to be paid by the
prosecuting county); Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1121 (state public defender appeared for
defense).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (limiting prior case law and
rejecting defendant's argument that prosecution appeal was barred because double
jeopardy law prevented further proceedings).
48 See, e.g., id. at 82 (appealing from an intermediate appellate court where the
defense successfully argued the double jeopardy issue in connection with prosecution
appeal, the prosecution thereafter successfully sought further review of that double
jeopardy issue in a higher appellate court, in which defense counsel appeared); Com-
monwealth v. Smalis, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 490 A.2d 394 (Pa. 1985)
(same), rev'd sub nom. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
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ing on whether the double jeopardy claim has been finally resolved in
the defendant's favor.49
B. Smalis
A 1986 Supreme Court case, Smalis v. Pennsylvania,0 highlights
the need for making the distinctions discussed above. The actual fo-
cus of the Smalis case was the Double Jeopardy Clause's effect on the
grant of a mid-trial demurrer. The highest state court permitted a
prosecution appeal from a trial judge's grant of a defense demurrer to
the prosecution's case in a nonjury trial. In doing so, the state
supreme court found that a reversal would create no double jeopardy
problem to further trial court prosecution and it remanded to the
state intermediate appellate court to consider the merits of the prose-
cutor's underlying claim of trial court error.5l The intermediate court
had come to the opposite conclusion on the double jeopardy issue
and had dismissed the prosecution appeal.52 The Supreme Court of
the United States concluded that double jeopardy principles would
indeed bar further prosecution, a predictable conclusion in light of
49 In sum, the appropriate analysis suggests a sequence of questions for state
courts when considering dismissal of prosecution appeals for lack ofjurisdiction aris-
ing from double jeopardy protection. Preliminarily, as in all appeals, a court should
determine whether there is statutory language conferring appellate jurisdiction for
the underlying prosecutorial claim. If the prosecutor's appeal appears to be allowed
by the statute, in those states where statutory language does not expressly condition
appeal on a lack of double jeopardy bar, a further two-step analysis is in order. The
first step is to analyze whether legal principles (including federal or state double jeop-
ardy principles) preclude applying against the defendant the remedy being sought by
the prosecutor. If the remedy is precluded, the case is moot and the court must
further consider a second step: whether the jurisdiction is one in which advisory opin-
ions are permitted under the circumstances. A negative answer to this question would
call for dismissal of the appeal; an affirmative answer would normally lead to appellate
consideration of the merits of the prosecutor's underlying claim.
In jurisdictions where statutory language itself bars appeal due to double jeop-
ardy protection (see, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text) the inquiry about
advisory opinions is unnecessary. Instead, the double jeopardy inquiry becomes part
of the preliminary inquiry about the court's appellate jurisdiction as formulated by
the statute.
50 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
51 The underlying claim was whether the trial judge erred in finding the evidence
was not sufficient to withstand the demurrer motion. See Commonwealth v. Smalis,
sub nom. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 490 A.2d at 394 (remanding to the superior court
to determine if the demurrer was properly granted). Zoller was a companion case
consolidated for state appeal; only the defendants in, Smalis reached the U.S. Supreme
Court ,and the facts of Zoller are not important for purposes of this Article.
52 Commonwealth v. Smalis, 480 A.2d 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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the existing content of double jeopardy law unless the Supreme
Court's then-recent cases were to be overruled or modified.53 The
United States Supreme Court's critical resolution was to treat the de-
murrer ruling as a double jeopardy bar to further trial court prosecu-
tion. However, it is not this double jeopardy determination which is
important here. Rather, what is of interest is the Supreme Court's
further language as it grappled with the connection between the
double jeopardy bar and the prosecution appeal. The Court's lan-
guage calls for further reflection and possible future adjustment.
Smalis ventured into new territory in the sense that it was the first
Supreme Court case to confront a double jeopardy bar to a state pros-
ecutor's prosecution appeal of an underlying issue.54 Although not
expressly recognized as such, a novel point inherent in Smalis was
what the appropriate Supreme Court disposition should be in a case
involving a state prosecution appeal in a state appellate court when the
U.S. Supreme Court has decided that double jeopardy precludes fur-
ther prosecution, thereby raising a mootness issue as to the underly-
ing claims on the merits. As will be seen, a focus on the exact role of
double jeopardy in prosecution appeals would assist in reaching a
clear resolution of this issue. An expectable Supreme Court disposi-
tion might have been the reversal of the judgment of the state's high-
53 SeeJames A. Strazzella, Double Jeopardy, 4 PA. L. J. 11 (No. 39, 1981) (arguing
that the Pennsylvania grant of demurrer acted as an acquittal under U.S. Supreme
Court double jeopardy case law defining an acquittal and that state law was in conflict
in allowing further prosecution).
54 Most Supreme Court double jeopardy cases subsequent to the 1969 due pro-
cess incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause dealt either with defendants' ap-
peals or federal prosecution appeals. Of the few additional state prosecution appeals
decided by the Court and involving double jeopardy issues in any form, only Smalis
involved double jeopardy as a bar to reaching an underlying prosecution appeal
claim. The few other state prosecution appeal cases involved a contested trial court
dismissal ruling, based on double jeopardy grounds; these cases did not entail the
question of double jeopardy as injecting a bar to consideration of another claim. See
Ohio v.Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) (involving prosecution appeal of validity of trial
judge's dismissal, on double jeopardy grounds, of remaining counts after defendant
pled guilty to lesser crimes over prosecutor's objection); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31
(1982) (involving prosecution appeal of trial judge's pretrial dismissal, dependent on
effect of earlier appellate court ruling concerning weight of evidence in the first
trial); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (involving state appeal of trial court's
pretrial dismissal of indictment on double jeopardy grounds). The hybrid case of
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981), involved a state prosecution removed to
federal court and dealt with a statutory interpretation issue: whether the state prose-
cutor was authorized to appeal in such a situation. The Court noted it was not decid-
ing whether the appeal would be barred through the Double Jeopardy Clause, a
question not decided by the lower court and one not raised by the parties in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 238 n.12.
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est court with a ruling that the defendant could not be subjected to
further 'jeopardy," accompanied by a remand for appropriate further
state appellate court action in light of that federal determination.
This would allow the state court to dispose of the state prosecutor's
appeal in light of the state's own doctrine concerning advisory
opinions.
The Supreme Court's ultimate judgment, in fact, was that "[t]he
judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is Reversed,"55 but the
opinion's language goes beyond this disposition. Smalis declared that
the state intermediate appellate court had correctly held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars a postacquittal "appeal" by the prosecu-
tion not only when it might result in a second trial but also if reversal
would translate into "'further proceedings of some sort, devoted to
the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense
charged.'"56 The opinion's statement that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a postacquittal "appeal" reflects existing law concerning
appellate proceedings only if not read literally and if read as a tele-
scoped statement involving the circumstances of Smalis. For example,
it is accurate under existing Supreme Court law only if read in light of
the statement's focus on the intermediate appellate court ruling in a
state whose courts avoid advisory opinions57 and if the language is
read to mean double jeopardy thereby indirectly bars the appeal as a
matter of state law.
Additional problematic language appears in the Smalis Court's
opinion: "When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution
would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the appeal itself has no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal
would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to the
proceedings against him."58 It is difficult to conceive of an actual situ-
ation covered by this language. If the case is one in which an appel-
late court has finally found an acquittal barring further prosecution
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, there can be no successful prose-
cution appeal that would lead to proceedings that violate the Double
55 Smalis, 476 U.S. at 146.
56 i& at 145, 146 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564, 570 (1977)).
57 See, e.g., Commonwealth v.Jubelirer, 614 A.2d 204, 212-13 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that the court "will not break with long tradition of refusing to give advisory opin-
ions"); Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 368 A.2d 648 (Pa. 1977); Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. County of Allegheny, 203 A.2d 544 (Pa. 1964); Schoenbrun v.
Nettrour, 61 A.2d 868, 869 (Pa. 1948); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 352
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
58 Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145.
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Jeopardy Clause. Furtherjeopardy is barred and the appeal is moot as
to the defendant, whether or not an advisory opinion is issued. If a
defendant who had received a final favorable double jeopardy ruling
were forced to further participate in an appeal for which there was no
proper purpose, there might well be a constitutional problem (per-
haps a due process problem), but no realistic sequence presents such
a situation. Conversely, until a final decision on the bar is reached,
the appeal is live and does serve a proper purpose in resolving that
controversy. Thus the Smalis language-that "[w] hen a successful pos-
tacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper
purpose"-describes no realistic situation. Furthermore, the lan-
guage describes a situation not presented in Smalis. The Smalis issue
was whether the demurrer ruling did constitute a double jeopardy bar,
not whether the defendant could be further prosecuted despite a le-
gitimate double jeopardy claim or whether there could be a state ap-
peal if double jeopardy barred further prosecution.
In still further complicating language, the Court continued: "We
hold, therefore, that the trial judge's granting of [defendants'] de-
murrer was an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that
the Commonwealth's appeal was barred because reversal would have led to
further trial proceedings."59 Here, too, the language does not reflect
a realistic possibility. Until the double jeopardy claim was finally re-
solved (in this case, by the United States Supreme Court) there was no
recognized bar to appeal, indirect or otherwise. Conversely, after
such resolution there was no possibility that "reversal would have led
to further trial proceedings." The litigants did not argue otherwise.
Nor does the language otherwise reflect existing federal principles in
suggesting a bar to appeal on double jeopardy grounds. In essence,
whether the appeal is barred is a state question.
The Smalis language should therefore be read in context. None
of the briefs filed in the Supreme Court found it necessary to focus on
the exact relationship of double jeopardy to a state prosecution ap-
peal and on the consequences of that relationship, nor did any of the
lower court opinions.60
59 Smalis, 476 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
60 The briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court did, however, address the jurisdictional
argument concerning whether the posture of the case deprived the Court of its statu-
tory appellate jurisdiction because the case, arguably, did not yet possess the requisite
"finality" required for Supreme Court review, but this is a separate issue. The Court
concluded that the case had the requisite finality. See Smalis, 476 U.S. at 143 n.4. The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction had been asserted under a statute allowing review only
of state court "final" judgments or decrees. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982) (stating the
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Perhaps the Court's language-that the prosecution "appeal was
barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings"-
was a result of the Court's more familiar and routine practice in fed-
eral prosecution appeals: in federal cases, the federal. statute itself bars
the appeal and makes dismissal of the appeal the appropriate federal
remedy. Moreover, as noted, the language is understandable if seen
as only verifying the lower intermediate appellate court's conclusion
under a combination of federal law (double jeopardy) and state law
(no advisory opinions in Pennsylvania). In this reading, perhaps the
language is a shorthand formulation, telescoping the result of a pat-
tern that is common in most states, where the double jeopardy bar
indirectly leads to dismissal of the appeal.
Standing alone, the Smalis statement-that "[a] llowing such an
appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to
the proceedings against him"-does not measure up to prior law and
is particularly troubling if it was indeed meant as the "holding" the
Court's language characterized it to be. It is true that a defendant
requirement now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994)). This argument revolved
around the fact that further proceedings were still to be had on the merits in the state
appellate courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had determined that the interme-
diate appellate court had erred in finding that the grant of a demurrer barred further
prosecution. It then had remanded to the intermediate court for it to pass upon the
question of whether the trial judge had correctly granted the demurrer. See Com-
monwealth v. Smalis, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 450 A.2d 394, 401-02 (Pa.
1985), rev'd sub nom. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986). These further pro-
ceedings might still have eventuated in a finding in favor of the defendant on the
merits, thus ending the case. Alternatively, the state appellate courts might have
ruled against the defendant and authorized further proceedings, at that time making
the case more dearly ripe for U.S. Supreme Court adjudication. For arguments relat-
ing to this point in the briefs in the Supreme Court, see [Defendants'] Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986) (No. 85-227);
[Commonwealth's] Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28-29;
Brief for Petitioners at 23; Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae (supporting
the Commonwealth) at 1-3.
In light of the earlier discussion in this Article (see supra text accompanying notes
2-9), it is interesting to note that in the course of arguing that the case was not ripe
for Supreme Court review under the finality doctrine, the Brief for the United States
As Amicus Curiae noted, "Here there could be no suggestion that consideration of
the Commonwealth's appeal could itself violate federal rights of any kind." Id. at 2
n.1. Alluding to the further intermediate appellate proceedings contemplated by the
state supreme court's action, the brief also noted, "Petitioners do not assert-nor
could they-that such proceedings would themselves violate double jeopardy con-
straints." Id. at 2.
Proceedings in the Smalis case subsequent to the action of the Supreme Court of
the United States are recounted in Commonwealth v. Smais, 592 A.2d 669, 669-71
(Pa.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859 (1991).
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finally adjudged to have a double jeopardy bar will have no stake in
the appeal, once that final adjudication is reached. That is, a defend-
ant for whom it has been decided at the highest appellate level that
further trial court prosecution would be barred by double jeopardy
has no interest in the appeal and can not be made to participate. As
discussed above, only when that point is reached has the burden on
the defendant in any court, trial or appellate, come to an end under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court's language suggesting that an
appeal "would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to
the proceedings" seems incorrect because a defendant would not be
obliged to participate further in any way. For such a defendant the
appeal is entirely moot. But, contrary to the Court's implication and
under long-established principles, the appeal proceeding is not itself
covered by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Were the Smalis language to be read as language intended to
bring an appellate proceeding directly within the bar of the federal
Double Jeopardy Clause, Smalis would create a dramatic and basic
shift both in previously defined Supreme Court double jeopardy law
and in the states' independent ability to decide whether to issue advi-
sory opinions. Such a striking change in constitutional law should not
be attributed to this language without a clear indication that the
Court meant to overrule long-established lines of case law and to work
major changes to basic principles. 61 Smalis is thus best read against
61 Given the power of Supreme Court language to take on a life of its own beyond
the context of the case, there is always the danger that the Smalis language will be
cited to support the somewhat misstated and telescoped view that the taking of the
appeal itself will violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Commonwealth Dep't of
Envtl. Resources v. Monarch Pallet Corp., 532 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987) .("According to Smalis, the grant of a demurrer is a functional equivalent of an
acquittal. DER's appeal to this Court is thus barred because of the doctrine of double
jeopardy."); see also Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 307 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that a
judgment of acquittal may not be appealed when a second trial would become neces-
sary following a reversal); Commonwealth v. Stein, 526 A.2d 411, 412 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (stating that "in Smalis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a grant of demurrer
to an accused cannot be appealed where reversal would lead to further trial proceed-
ings thereby implicating the double jeopardy clause"); Commonwealth v. Williams,
541 A.2d 7, 7-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (stating emphatically that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was never intended to impose a general ban on prosecutorial appeals, but only
further proceedings related to the accused's guilt or innocence).
The danger of misformulation exists, of course, even without the additional im-
petus provided by Smalis. See, e.g., State v. Paolella, 554 A.2d 702, 708 (Conn. 1989)
(stating that "[tlhe double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the federal
constitution prohibits the prosecution of appeals from judgments of acquittals" and
finding that an acquittal bars the court from reviewing the prosecution claim by rely-
ing on language in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978), which is correct for
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the formulation of the issues actually raised and the procedural set-
ting of the case, including the background point that the state in-
volved refuses to issues advisory opinions.62 The Smalis language also
serves as a reminder of the need to sort out the exact relationship of
double jeopardy to prosecution appeals.
V. CONCLUSION
Inaccurate statutory and case law formulations concerning the
role that double jeopardy law plays in prosecution appeals further
complicates an already complex area of the law. Such formulations
also may inject unintended and unwarranted limitations on prosecu-
tion appeals.
Statutes that take inaccurate account of the precise effect of
double jeopardy law with regard to prosecution appeals raise several
major legislative and judicial dangers. First, they may appear to inval-
idly authorize appeals in cases when only nonjusticiable cases can re-
sult. Second, they can bar appeals in states where double jeopardy
law, although barring reprosecution, would not bar the prosecution
appeal itself because state law allows for advisory opinions. Both situa-
tions create severe problems of interpretation for state courts and may
needlessly confront state courts with difficult and unintended state
constitutional law problems. Moreover, inexact statutory statements
concerning the effect of double jeopardy law prevent a clear focus on
the precise situations in which legislators actually desire to authorize
or prohibit prosecution appeals, even when double jeopardy law does
not bar reprosecution.
Similarly, case law inexactly formulating the place of double jeop-
ardy in prosecution appeals-perhaps suggesting that double jeop-
ardy law directly bars a prosecution appeal-raises its own additional
dangers. In the face of inaccurate statements about the reach of fed-
eral double jeopardy law, the danger exists that some states will be
improperly precluded from effectuating a system actually allowed by
the federal constitution: a system in which prosecutors can obtain an
advisory opinion on the underlying issue, with the ruling applicable
only to future cases. Only a minority of state legislative schemes allow
such advisory opinions in prosecution appeals, but neither the
number of states effectuating such a system nor the wisdom of such a
federal cases in light of the federal statutory formulation but which is not necessarily
true for state cases); State v. Gustin, 510 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Kan. 1973) (stating before
Smalis was decided that "[a]ppellate review of the decision after acquittal would con-
stitute double jeopardy").
62 See supra note 57.
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procedure is the critical point here. Instead, the point is that where
state law allows and elects such a system, federal doctrine permits it.
A precise analysis of the actual relationship of double jeopardy to
prosecution appeals presents clearly the actual choices on which the
appropriate decision makers-legislators and judges-can best focus.
